taken from:
Sacher, John M. 1970-
"A Very Disagreeable Business": Confederate Conscription in Louisiana
Civil War History - Volume 53, Number 2, June 2007, pp. 141-169
"In October 1862, Robert Carter, a wealthy planter living in Concordia Parish, in the fertile cotton-growing delta along the Mississippi River in northeast Louisiana, faced conscription into the Confederate army. Rather than enter the service, Carter, whose family owned two plantations and 194 slaves, contracted with Frederick W. Scheuber to serve as his substitute. As a German, Scheuber was not subject to Confederate conscription and therefore could serve in someone else's place. Carter possessed both the motives and the means to avoid military service. In addition to wanting to escape the dangers inherent in life in the army, Carter possibly feared both losing control of his slaves and exposing his family to the enemy, especially with the Union army, as part of its attack on Vicksburg, less than fifty miles north of his home. With Carter's wealth exceeding $120,000, his agreement to pay Scheuber $2,500 at the end of the war and to provide Scheuber's wife with $20.83 per month (10 percent per year) until that time would not prove an insurmountable financial burden. Although Scheuber may have needed the money, he did not live to see the end of the war, perishing at Berwick Bay in April 1863, less than one year after signing his contract with Carter. During Scheuber's time of service, Carter paid the money to three of the German's female relatives, but it remains unclear whether he paid the full amount upon Scheuber's death. (1)
The story of men such as Robert Carter and Frederick Scheuber illustrates the dramatic impact of Confederate conscription on Southerners and the effect that variables such as wealth, ethnicity, and the proximity of the Union army played in their decisions regarding the draft. From the beginning of the Civil War, Confederate leaders recognized that fighting a nation with superior manpower necessitated mobilizing as great a percentage of the South's white male population as possible. For the first year of the conflict, the Confederacy relied on one-year volunteers. It became quickly apparent, however, that the army needed more men and that it needed them to fight for more than a single year. Thus, in April 1862, as many of the original volunteers' enlistments were set to expire, the Confederate Congress passed, and President Jefferson Davis signed, a national conscription act. This measure lengthened volunteers' enlistments from one year to the duration of the war and called for a draft of all white men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. (2)
Historians who take aim at Confederate conscription face a moving target. First, Congress modified conscription policy several times, and thus the reactions it engendered changed as well. The age range expanded, and Congress repeatedly altered the exemption policy. Among the most significant of these adjustments were the addition of an exemption for owners of twenty slaves in October 1862 and ending substitution in January 1864. Second, a variety of factors, including wealth, ethnicity, and gender, could shape one's attitude toward the policy and toward those who resisted it. Third, Southerners' impressions of the measure varied based on where they lived, particularly on their family's proximity to the Union army. An area safely within Confederate lines might accept conscription, but if later that home front faced Union occupation or simply lost the protection of the Confederate army, men might be much less willing to leave their families to fight. In order to assess the impact of all of these variables and gain a fuller understanding of conscription, one can focus on the measure's impact on the individual states of the Confederacy. Historians have examined conscription policy in Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and elsewhere, but no one has made a thorough examination of conscription in Louisiana. (3)
In some respects, conscription in Louisiana paralleled that in other Southern states: Louisiana's governors, both Thomas Overton Moore (1860-64) and his successor Henry Watkins Allen (1864-65), squabbled with the national government in Richmond over state sovereignty; the various draft exemptions caused friction between rich and poor, especially slaveholders and nonslaveholders; and the attitudes of civilians toward the draft demonstrated the conflicting demands of battlefront and the home front. In other aspects, Louisianans experienced the draft differently from other Confederates. From 1862 onward, the Union army occupied key parts of the state, most important New Orleans, the state's largest city, which had no peer elsewhere in the South. Also, Louisiana's significant foreign-born and Cajun populations complicated the conscription process with some of the former group exempt from the provisions of the act and with the latter often having very little attachment to the Confederacy.
On a practical level, the combination of conscription and volunteering clearly mobilized a tremendous percentage of Louisiana's white male population. The numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. The few extant figures are incomplete, and the Union's occupation of various parts of the state complicates the equation. Nonetheless, in enforcing conscription, Confederate officials experienced some success. They formed conscription camps in Monroe, Tangipahoa (Camp Moore), and outside of New Iberia (Camp Pratt). For most of the Civil War, the Confederate command divided Louisiana between two administrative units. The Florida Parishes, the region of the state east of the Mississippi River and north of Lake Pontchartrain, were part of the Department of the Gulf, while the rest of Louisiana was part of the Trans-Mississippi Department. Situated in the latter department, Camp Pratt, two miles north of New Iberia, received the majority of the state's conscripts. (4)
At the end of 1862, Louisiana native General Richard Taylor, emphasizing the army's recruiting success in Louisiana, proclaimed that in northern Louisiana few conscripts could be found with "nearly the whole population between eighteen and thirty-five having volunteered." State officials and state documents buttress the idea that the combination of volunteering and the draft had motivated a substantial number of Louisianans to join the war effort. Partial state records indicate that by the end of 1862 (only eight months after the draft had begun), 8,690 of the approximately 40,000 Louisianans in the armed service were conscripts, and that number reflects only the thirty-eight parishes (out of a total of forty-eight) that reported results. Two years later, in his annual message to the legislature, Governor Moore proclaimed that Louisiana had provided 52,000 troops to the Confederacy, an exceptional number for a partially occupied state whose largest prewar vote total had been 50,511. Local officials in Moore's home parish of Rapides concurred. A Rapides newspaper claimed in 1862 that the parish had answered the call with more than 500 conscripts; the following year it added that "the conscript act means nothing to Rapides," as all the men in the parish had already joined the war effort. (5)
Other accounts, however, conflict with this picture of a united front of adult, white male Louisianans volunteering or accepting conscription as Confederates. In October 1863, future governor Allen offered a very different assessment of the situation in southwest Louisiana. He lamented that "the country here is full of deserters and runaway conscripts.... I am told they number 8,000." Another officer described as many as 1,500 conscripts and deserters hidden in just three of the Florida Parishes, and yet another suggested that the woods of Sabine Parish contained two hundred draft dodgers. Although these reports may have exaggerated the problem, they indicate that parts of the state served as havens for those resisting conscription. Perhaps the mixed message of Assistant Adjutant General S. S. Anderson best demonstrates the difficulty of relying on numbers alone to judge the success of conscription. He reported that "by sending a single company into one of the parishes of Louisiana, 400 conscripts were obtained." Any optimism engendered by that phrase is quickly tempered by his admission that this success occurred only after "shooting four of their number." (6)
In attempting to reconcile these diverse views of conscription's success in Louisiana, one must consider where and when these officials described the process. In When the Yankees Came, Stephen V. Ash creates a useful model for understanding the interaction between Southerners and the Union army. He contends that the occupied South should be seen as three regions: garrisoned towns that faced a constant Union army presence; no-man's-lands, which lay beyond Confederate control but lacked the day-to-day occupation of Union troops; and Confederate frontiers where the Confederacy had authority but which were not immune to Union incursions. Not only does his discussion accurately depict many Louisianans' wartime experiences, but it also proves very helpful in understanding the varied reactions to conscription policies within the Pelican State. Over the course of the Civil War, the area of Louisiana subject to Confederate authority contracted with the northwest migration of the capital from Baton Rouge to Opelousas in 1862 and to Shreveport the following year being a good benchmark of the shrinking of Confederate Louisiana. The precise boundaries of Union occupation varied from month to month, but regardless of the exact location of enemy units, many Louisianans felt that the Confederate government had abdicated its responsibility for their protection, and consequently they resisted conscription into the Confederate army. (7)
In April 1862, the same month that the Confederate Congress passed the first conscription act, the Union army captured New Orleans, which not only served as the state's business center but also contained nearly half of the state's white population. For the rest of the conflict, the Union military, first under Benjamin Butler and later under Nathaniel P. Banks, governed the city. Southern men in the city were beyond the reach of Confederate conscription officers, and its Union-controlled newspapers railed against the conscription process. After securing New Orleans, the Union army occupied other areas of the state, including Baton Rouge and the Bayou Lafourche region, and in both 1863 and 1864 federals invaded up the Red River. Additionally, the Union army's efforts to capture Vicksburg, Mississippi, led to an occupation of northeast Louisiana beginning in 1862. (8)
Therefore, throughout the three years of Confederate conscription, most of Louisiana's draft-eligible men remained in garrisoned towns, no-man's-lands, or on the Confederate frontier. Both General Taylor's assessment and the state's official conscription report for 1862 demonstrate the impact of Union occupation on Confederate conscription. In November 1862 Taylor informed the secretary of war that the parishes where it was "most difficult to execute the conscription law are the river parishes from Carroll down and the Gulf parishes from New Orleans to the Sabine River [the border with Texas]." All of these parishes had either already suffered from or were vulnerable to future Union invasion. According to the state's 1862 annual conscription report, ten of the forty-eight parishes filed no conscription returns with six of these (Orleans, St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. Charles, and St. John) in the immediate vicinity of occupied New Orleans and two others (Madison and Carroll) on the Mississippi River opposite Vicksburg. (9)
Fearing Confederate conscription more than the Union army, some Louisianans fled to garrisoned towns and received Union passports. In Baton Rouge, Mira Cooper, a Confederate loyalist, complained of "white contrabands" who escaped to the enemy's lines to avoid service in the Confederate army. An unrepentant rebel, she considered these men "a step below contempt." A Union soldier based there agreed that both men and women entered in the former capital in order to buy goods and that they willingly took a loyalty oath to do so. This type of escape route, however, was fraught with peril. According to Governor Moore, Louisianans who returned from Union lines and then tried to use either Union passports or evidence of having taken a loyalty oath in order to avoid Confederate conscription would be treated as traitors. Ironically, men who fled into garrisoned regions to avoid Confederate conscription could find themselves subject to the Union draft instead. In the Lafourche region, the Union army required military-age men to take an oath of allegiance in order to avoid arrest and to keep their..."